1. Preliminary Considerations

Our present epoch is characterized by the discrepancy that exists between our scientific and technical knowledge on the one hand, and the little knowledge we as yet have about man, on the other.

This is not just a theoretical discrepancy, but a most important practical one as well: if man cannot know more about himself, and use this knowledge for the better organization of his life, he will be destroyed by the very products of his scientific knowledge. But isn't this need for man to gain a better knowledge of himself not anready being met by the thousands of investigators in the fields of psychology, social psychology, psychoanalysis, human relations, etc.? The answer to this question is vital with regard to the foundation of a new "institute for the science of man." If one feels that the aims of a science of man are being adequately covered by the existing social sciences, then indeed one should be strengthening the existing framwork and not be founding new institutes.

Those participating in the discussions about the new Institute very clearly hold that the existing social sciences do not provide what is needed.

These are some of the reasons for this conviction:

(1) The social sciences of today (with a number of notable exceptions), impressed by the success and prestige of the natural sciences, try to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the furthering of man. Not only do they not ask themselves whether the method valid for the study of things is also valid for the study of man, but they even fail to question whether this concept of the scientific method is not naive and outdated. They believe that only a method which counts and weighs can be called scientific, forgetting that the most advanced natural sciences today, such as theoretical physics, operate with bold hypotheses based on imaginative inferences. Even intuition, according to Einstein, should not be despised. The result of this imitation of a badly understood scienific method is that the method of "facts and figures" determines the problems one studies. Researchers choose insignificant problems because the answers can be put into figures and mathematical formulae, instead of choosing significant problems and developing new methods suitable to the study of these problems.

The result is that there are thousands of research projects, most of which do not touch on the fundamental questions of man. The thinking applied in these projects is not rigorous but rather of a naive, practical-technical nature, and it is no wonder that the advanced natural sciences rather than the social sciences attract the best brains of the nation.

(2) Closely related to the problem of a misunderstood scientific method is the relativism with which the social sciences are imbued. While we still pay lip service to the great humanistic tradition, most social scientists have adopted an attitude of complete relativism, an attitude in which values are considered a matter of taste but of no objective validity. Because it is a difficult task to probe the objective validity of values, social science has chosen the easier path of throwing them out altogether. In doing so, it has neglected the fact that our whole world is endangered by the increasing loss of a sense of values, which has led to an increasing incapacity to use constructively the fruits of our thoughts and efforts in the natural sciences.

(3) Another aspect of this relativism is the loss of a concept of man as a definite entity underlying the various manifestations of man as they appear in various cultures. One studies man as if he were a blank sheet of paper on which every culture writes its own text, rather than as a being that is not only biologically but also psychologoically a definable entity. If we do not regain this concept of man as an underlying reality, how can we expect to make fruitful use of the growing geographical and social unity of man, which is the historical trend of the future?

2. General Aims

In the light oo these preliminary considerations, we arrive at the formulation of the general aim of the Institute, which is to pursue the scientific study of man in the spirit of humanism. More specifically, this has the following implications. Firstly, the study of man must be based on certain humane concerns, primarily those which have been the concern of the whole humanistic religious and philosophical tradition: the idea of the dignity of man and of his potentialities for love and reason which can be actualized under favorable circumstances. Secondly, the study of man must be based on those concerns which result from our own historical situation: the breakdown of our traditional value system, the uncontrolled and unstructured growth of purely intellectual and technical activities, and the resulting need to find a new, rational foundation for the establishment of the values of the humanistic tradition. These concerns assume that in spite of all differences man is one species, not only biologically and physiologically but also mentally and psychologically.

These general aims can be accomplished only if methods proper to the study of man are examined and developed. The problem is not that of choosing between a scientific and a non-scientific study of man, but of determining what constitutes the proper rational method for the understanding of man and what does not.

A humanistic science of man must continue the work of the great students of man of the past, such as Aristotle and Spinoza. It will be enriched by the new data which biology, physiology and sociology are giving us, and by our own experiences as contemporaries in this age of transition who are concerned with the future of man.

In this latter respect one more remark appears to be necessary. It is often said by social scientists that one condition of scientific inquiry is the absence of any self-interested or preconceived aims. That this is a naive assuption is clearly shown by the development of the natural sciences: they are to a large extent furthered and not hindered by practical aims and necessities. It is the task of the scientist to keep his data objective, not to study without aims - which are what give meaning and impulse to his work. Just as every age has its specific economic and technical problems, so it also has its specific human problems, and the study of man today must be prompted and guided by the problems engendered in this period of world history.

3. Specific Aims

(1) The study of the methods proper for the science of man: It has to be established what differences in approach exist between the study of things and the study of living beings, especially man. For instance, there is a difference between the "objective" approach, in which the "object" is nothing but an object, and an approach in which the observer at the same time relates empathically to the persons he observes.

(2) The study of the concept of man and of human nature: While humanistic philosophy assumes the unity of all mankind, there is a great need for rational and demonstrable proof that there is indeed such a thing as man and human nature beyond the purely anatomical and physiological realm. The concept of human nature must be established by integrating what we know of man in the past with what we know of man in various highly developed and relatively primitive cultures today. The task is to go beyond a descriptive anthropology, and to study the basic human forces behind the manifold varities in which it is expressed. The thoroughgoing dynamic study of all manifestations of human nature will lead to the inference of a tentative picture of human nature and what the laws governing it are. A humanistic science of man must begin with the concept of human nature, while at the same time aiming to discover what this human nature is. Needless to say, a number of studies should be made of different societies (industrial, preindustrial, primitive) in which hypotheses on human nature should be tested.

(3) The study of values: It must be shown that certain values are not simply matters of taste, but are rooted in the very existence of man. It has to be demonstrated which these such basic values are and how they are rooted in the very nature of man. Values in all cultures must be studied in order to find any underlying unity; and a study of the moral evolution of mankind must also be attempted. Furthermore, it is necessary to investigate what effect the violation of basic ethical norms has on the individual and on the culture. According to the relativists, any norm is valid once it is established by the culture whether it is murder or love. Humanism claims that certain norms are inherent in man's existential situation, and that their violation results in certain consequences which are inimical to life.

(4) The study of destructiveness: Related to the above is the study of destructiveness in all its forms: destruction of others, self-destruction, sadism, and masochism. We know almost nothing about the causes of destructiveness, and yet there is an enormous field of empirical data which would permit us to establish at least hypotheses concerning the individual and social causes of destructiveness.

(5) The study of creativeness: There is an equally broad field of observation for the study of creative impulses in children, adolescents and adults, as well as of the factors which further or impede these impulses. The study of creativeness, as of destructiveness, must transcend the American scene and, if possible, use material from as many diverse cultures as can be obtained.

(6) The study of authority: The modern age of freedom and individualism has fought against authority and established as its ideal the complete absence of authority. This absence of overt authority, however, has helped to increase the power of anonymous authority, which, in turn, has led to a dangerous degree of conformity. It is necessary to study the problem of authority afresh and to differentiate empirically between irrational and rational forms of authority; also to study the phenomenon of conformism in all its manifestations.

(7) Study of the psychological premises of democratic organization: The idea of the responsible and well informed citizen who participates in the important decisions of the community is the centralconcept of democracy. But due to the quantitative increase in population and to the influence of methods of mass suggestion, the substance of democracy is weakening. Studies are necessary to show what goes on in the mind of the voter (beyond polling his opinion), how suggestible he is, what the fact that he can do little to influence political action does to the alertness of his political thinking. Experiments in group discussion and decisionmaking must be furthered, and their results studied.

(8) Study of the educational process: The fact is that we have more higher education than any people ever had anywhere in the world, but that our system of higher education does relatively little to stimulate critical thought and to influence character formation. As a number of studies have shown, the students are little affected by their teachers' personalities and, at best, get not much more than purely intellectual knowledge. New studies are needed to examine the learning situation and the student-teacher relationship. How can education can go beyond purely verbal intellectual processes into the realm of meaningful experience?

(9) Study of history as the evolution of man: Conventional history was studied in a provincial way. The roots of our culture in Palestine, Greece and Rome, and then European and American history, were in the center of attention. We need a true world history in which the evolution of man is shown in its right proportions. It must be shown how the same basic ideas have arisen in various branches of the human family, how some have merged and others remained separate, although the differences have been greatly overstated in comparison to the similarities. In a true History of Man, the evolution of man, his character and his ideas could be shown as well as his growth into an ever more integrated unity. Due emphasis would be given to the true proportions of various cultures and ages. Such a history should enable man to have an objective picture of the whole human race, its growth, integration, and unity. In recent years a number of universal histories more or less answering to this type have been written, but they do not meet the real need, which is that for a scholarly work of many volumes, written by a number of outstanding specialists united by a humanistic spirit.

4. General Remarks

(1) The Institute, in order to have any value, must have a distinctive image. This image cannot be adequately expressed in words (not so much because we have no words, but because they are misused in double-talk) but must rather be expressed by people who in their work and personalities express this image.

(2) The Institute should not follow the practice of the big foundations which has been in practice to encourage many people to think about a scientific problem in terms of what they can "sell" to a foundation, to think first about the funding and only later about what one wants to discover. The Institute should make money available only to the extent that a project really needs it. As a matter of principle, budgets should be kept within a reasonable minimum and should be entirely functional. In this way, the Institute would try to encourage the return to an old-fashioned way of working in which thinking and studying, and not the obtaining of funds and their administration, are at the center of research.

(3) The Institute should support two kinds of activities (as well as building up a library devoted to the science of man):

(a) The work of outstanding scholars: here the goal should not be a specific problem, but rather to support a productive personality who should be enabled to pursue his research into the science of man free from other restricting obligations.

(b) Specific research problems to be tackled by gifted people. The discovery of such persons could be one of the tasks of the Institute. Here grants should be given for specific projects.

The governing body of the Institute should develop its own research policy, not only choosing gifted people but also problems on the basis of an integrated study of the whole field. The governing body of the Institute would be, to an extent, a scientific planning body for the study of man.

(4) The Institute should support people and projects outside as well as inside of the U.S.A. Under no circumstances should grants be given to universities or other such bodies. Only persons and specific projects suggested and accepted by the Institute should receive grants.

(5) It is suggested that the Institute has an active governing body of 5 - 7 members who meet for at least a whole week twice a year, in order to discuss not only grants but the general plans for work, and to devote some time during the year to the preparation of this work in their own field. Such a body should be composed of representatives of various branches in the field of the science of man, but members should primarily be chosen on the basis of common principles, productivity and individual imagination. The bureaucratic spirit should be kept to a minimum.

Anmerkung:

1 First published in the Yearbook of the International Erich Fromm Society: Science of Man - Wissenschaft vom Menschen, Münster: LIT-Verlag, 1990, pp. 12-17. Eine deutsche Übersetzung erschien in: E. Fromm, Die Pathologie der Normalität. Zur Wissenschaft vom Menschen, Weinheim und Basel: Beltz Verlag 1991; München: Heyne Taschenbuch 1996, S. 133-143. Dort auch weitere Hinweise zur Entstehungsgeschichte dieser Arbeit aus dem Jahre 1957.

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